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A B S T R A C T   
Existing research has identified numerous barriers to the adoption of public health policies for alcohol, including 
the cross-cutting nature of the policy problem and industry influence. Recent developments in Ireland suggest 
that while formidable, such barriers can be overcome. Ireland’s 2018 alcohol legislation adopts key evidence- 
based measures, introducing pricing, availability and marketing regulations that are world-leading in public 
health terms. Drawing primarily on the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA), this study investigates the adoption of 
the Public Health (Alcohol) Act 2018. We draw data from 20 semi-structured interviews with politicians, gov-
ernment advisors, public health experts, and advocates, as well as from relevant primary documents, newspaper 
articles, and other material in the public domain. We find that increased public attention to alcohol-related 
harms in Ireland (problem stream), developments within the institutional location of policymaking (the policy 
stream), and the political pressure exerted by politicians and advocates (the political stream) all combined to 
open a policy window. Unlike previous alcohol policy reform efforts in Ireland, several personally committed and 
well-positioned leaders championed policy change. This study suggests that political leadership might be 
important in understanding why public health approaches to alcohol have been embraced in some contexts but 
not in others.   
1. Introduction 
Alcohol consumption has long been a source of major health and 
social problems in Ireland (Mongan and Long, 2016; Mongan et al., 
2007). A combination of factors has undermined previous attempts to 
address alcohol, specifically as a public health issue. First, the alcohol 
industry wields considerable political and economic power in Ireland 
(Butler, 2009, 2015; Hope and Butler, 2010; Hope, 2006, 2014; Mercille, 
2016; Butler et al., 2017; Calnan et al., 2018). Researchers have iden-
tified the liberalisation of the alcohol retail sector in the 2000s and the 
industry’s success in thwarting new regulations as key indicative ex-
amples (Mercille, 2016). A second barrier has been the failure of the 
government to develop a “fully integrated approach” across its several 
departments and agencies (Hope, 2006). In Ireland, about 11 different 
departments, ranging from health to finance, possess some responsibility 
for alcohol-related issues (Hope, 2006). The cross-cutting nature of 
alcohol has made coming to grips with this issue challenging. 
This present study considers how such barriers have been overcome 
in passing alcohol public health legislation after public health ideas on 
alcohol first gained traction. In 2009, the government commissioned a 
steering group to study alcohol-related harms, and how they may be 
reduced (Department of Health, 2012). The report’s recommendations 
formed the basis of the landmark Public Health (Alcohol) Bill (Gov-
ernment of Ireland, 2015). Between 2013 and 2018, the bill encountered 
multiple controversies and faced intense political scrutiny, first within 
government, and subsequently in the Oireachtas (parliament). The 
legislation was adopted in October 2018, the first time Ireland legislated 
alcohol as a public health issue (Lesch and McCambridge, 2021a). Its 
content comprehensively adopts key evidence-based measures, and it is 
world-leading in public health terms in addressing barriers arising from 
the cross-cutting nature of the policy problem (Baggott, 2010). The 
other key barrier is alcohol industry involvement in policymaking, 
which exists widely elsewhere, particularly in other major alcohol pro-
ducer countries (Holden et al., 2012; Lesch and McCambridge, 2020, 
2021b; McCambridge et al., 2013, 2014, 2018; Katikireddi et al., 
2014a). 
The multiple streams approach (MSA) is primarily used to explain 
why governments take up certain issues at a particular time (Kingdon, 
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1995; Zahariadis, 2003). Policy entrepreneurs are key in this con-
ceptualisation of the policy process. These are the actors who leverage 
their policy knowledge and political insights to advance specific policy 
solutions (Kingdon, 1995). Windows of opportunity open up for policy 
entrepreneurs when three independent streams converge: 1) the prob-
lem stream; 2) the policy stream and 3) the politics stream. The problem 
stream refers to the set of issues or conditions that become perceived as 
problematic. Policy actors’ attention to these problems emerge from 
changes in indicators, focusing events, and policy feedback (Kingdon, 
1995; Zahariadis, 2003). The policy stream encompasses specific solu-
tions that have been identified for addressing a given problem. Ideas in 
the policy stream tend to be generated within specialised policy com-
munities (Kingdon, 1995). Finally, the political stream refers to how 
shifts in the national mood, interest group environment, or 
decision-making personnel can influence what is considered politically 
acceptable (Kingdon, 1995; Zahariadis, 2003). Policy entrepreneurs’ 
success hinges on “waiting for the big wave”, the precise moments when 
these streams can be fruitfully combined (Zahariadis, 2003). 
The MSA has been previously applied to alcohol policy in various 
studies (Butler, 2015; Butler et al., 2017; Nicholls and Greenaway, 2015; 
Katikireddi et al., 2014b; Hawkins and McCambridge, 2019). In previ-
ous applications to Ireland, researchers have identified the political 
stream as a key barrier to policy change (Butler, 2015; Butler et al., 
2017). Despite indications of policy failure, politicians have often lacked 
the political will to carry out meaningful policy change. Thus recent 
developments in Ireland, and specifically the enactment of the Public 
Health (Alcohol) Bill in 2018, offer an opportunity to assess how the 
political stream has shifted over time. 
The MSA represents one way to conceptualise policy change. An 
alternative approach is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 
(Weible et al., 2009). The ACF highlights the role of collective action, 
specifically advocacy coalitions, in generating policy change. This 
framework considers policy actors, including interest groups, experts, 
and government officials, to be aggregated into competing coalitions. At 
the core of each coalition is a shared belief system; actors possess similar 
normative ideas about how an issue should be defined and how prob-
lems should be addressed. In the ACF, policy-oriented learning or 
external shocks are the main sources of policy change (Weible et al., 
2009). 
The ACF has been applied to recent alcohol policy developments in 
Scotland, England and Ireland, with public health actors and the alcohol 
industry identified as opposing coalitions in these contexts (Lesch and 
McCambridge, 2021b; Fergie et al., 2019; Thom et al., 2016). According 
to these studies, public health actors conceptualise alcohol consumption 
as a population-level problem and thus advocate for stricter laws that 
limit the availability, affordability and promotion of alcohol. In contrast, 
the industry coalition claims excessive alcohol consumption only affects 
a minority of drinkers, and thus regard targeted approaches as more 
appropriate policy solutions (McCambridge et al., 2013; Fergie et al., 
2019). The ACF’s analytical strength is it helps researchers understand 
why coalitions form and how they stick together. The framework pro-
vides less guidance in explaining how decision-makers respond to their 
tactics, and why the effectiveness of these tactics varies over time. To 
that end, the MSA serves a useful complementary function. By linking 
agenda-setting to broader shifts in the political environment (i.e., policy 
windows), the MSA clarifies the conditions for policy change. Thus, 
while the main focus of this article is on applying MSA, we also draw on 
concepts from the ACF to explore the role of advocacy coalitions. 
2. Methods 
This article explores how the Public Health (Alcohol) Bill 2015 made 
its way on to the agenda, and how the legislation was subsequently 
formulated. We use within-case analysis (Collier et al., 2010) to 
construct a record of the policy’s development, focusing specifically on 
the period between 2008 and 2018. 
Drawing on primary government policy documents, news articles, 
and secondary sources, the study charts the sequencing of developments 
within the policy process. We gathered primary documents by con-
ducting online searches of government websites. The Nexis database was 
used to access relevant media published between 2012 and 2018 in three 
major national newspapers: Irish Times, Irish Examiner and Irish 
Independent. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 20 individuals, 
including public health advocates and leading medical practitioners 
(13), public health experts (2), politicians (4) and a policy advisor (1). 
Alcohol industry representatives were not included as part of the 
interview sample, as access may be challenging and resulting data 
complex to interpret. To examine the views and activities of the alcohol 
industry we consulted a range of sources, including newspaper articles, 
press releases, and lobbying registry data. The main purpose of this 
study was to investigate how the alcohol bill got on the agenda and was 
subsequently passed. This makes both advocacy coalitions relevant to 
the analysis but not the central focus. 
We conducted interviews in-person or via Zoom between September 
2019 and August 2020. Interviewees were purposively sampled after 
having been identified through a combination of government docu-
ments, media reporting, and snowball sampling. Interviewees were 
selected because they had either been active participants in the policy 
process or possessed in-depth knowledge of the evolution of alcohol 
policy in Ireland. E-mail recruitment yielded a response rate of ~55% of 
all those targeted. We provided participants with a two-page informa-
tion sheet that described the purpose of the study and the rationale for 
recruitment. All participants provided informed consent prior to their 
interview. Ethics approval for the study was provided by the Research 
Governance Committee at the University of York in February 2019. 
The first author undertook all interviews. The interviews were 
recorded with permission and then transcribed verbatim. Transcripts 
were initially thematically coded and analysed using NVivo 12 by the 
first author. The transcripts were subsequently analysed in an iterative 
manner, with both authors reviewing them, generating and refining 
thematic material, and agreeing on interpretation. 
A broad set of themes, informed by policy studies research, were 
initially developed to organise and analyse the data. These included 
codes for different types of actors (e.g., advocates, the alcohol industry 
and politicians), different stages of the policy process (e.g., agenda- 
setting, policy formulation, and implementation) and different causal 
mechanisms (e.g. issue framing, coalition-building, and policy feed-
back). The initial thematic analysis revealed the importance of policy 
entrepreneurs and issue framing in driving the momentum of policy 
development. As such, we developed specific codes associated with the 
MSA (e.g., problem stream, policy stream and politics stream) and its 
core concepts (e.g., policy entrepreneurs, focusing events) to analyse the 
data in moving towards the refinement of thematic content. Below we 
present a chronologically organised account of the context and the de-
velopments within each of the three streams that led to the opening of 
the policy window, and the resulting decision-making steps leading to 
the adoption of the legislation. 
We took various steps to ensure the reliability of the interview 
findings. Descriptions of key events and decisions were cross-referenced 
with other data sources, including public statements, primary docu-
ments and newspaper coverage, as part of the wider process of trian-
gulation in generating secure inferences. This necessarily addressed the 
interpretations of the significance of particular issues by the in-
terviewees themselves. 
A potential limitation is that some of the key actors involved in 
decision-making were not included as part of the interview sample. Our 
efforts to recruit two of the health ministers were unsuccessful. Access to 
elected officials poses a common challenge for researchers probing 
politically sensitive issues. One potential solution is to recruit partici-
pants who can share insights into the actors and/or issues of interest but 
who are no longer active in politics or industry. A second solution is to 
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interview gatekeepers such as public officials and political staff who may 
be “privy to behind-the-scenes action” (Marland and Esselment, 2018). 
We implemented both strategies with some success. In the case of in-
dustry actors, we relied on secondary data sources to better understand 
their policy preferences and strategies, as well as the accounts provided 
by the interviewees. 
3. Results 
3.1. Policy context 
As in other major producer countries, the public health community 
and the alcohol industry have formed two opposing coalitions in Ireland. 
The former is made up of advocacy organisations, civil society groups, 
health experts, medical professionals and government officials (pri-
marily in the Department of Health). The core members of this coalition 
– Alcohol Action Ireland, the Royal College of Physicians Ireland (RCPI) 
and other civil society groups – have organised under the umbrella of the 
Alcohol Health Alliance Ireland (Lesch and McCambridge, 2021b). The 
alcohol industry coalition consists of producers, trade associations, 
wholesalers and retailers, as well as allies in other sectors and 
non-health government departments. Industry actors have coordinated 
their political activities through industry associations. This has occurred 
primarily through Drinks Ireland, formerly the Alcohol Beverage 
Federation of Ireland (ABFI), a drinks sector association that operates 
within IBEC, the main business lobby group in Ireland (Interview C-3, 
Interview C1). Although alcohol industry actors form the core of the 
coalition, they have secured support from other actors and sectors when 
common interests have been identified in policy debates (see below). 
Both coalitions have competed to influence the direction of alcohol 
policy in Ireland. Public health actors have historically found it difficult 
to counter the alcohol industry’s influence within successive Irish gov-
ernments (Interviews A-4, A-5, B-1). Ireland’s rising prosperity in recent 
decades has meant that economic priorities have dominated public 
health issues in discussions over alcohol policy. For example, in 
November 2000, the government allowed licensed establishments to 
stay open for longer when it adopted the Intoxicating Liquor Act 2000. At 
the time, the Justice Minister also established a Commission on Liquor to 
review Ireland’s alcohol licensing system. The Commission produced 
several reports between May 2001 and April 2003 but failed to engage 
with the concerns identified previously. As one former policy advisor in 
the Department of Health explained, the government relied on a self- 
regulation system for the alcohol industry. Health officials were 
reportedly less comfortable with this approach, deeming self-regulation 
as an ineffective response to alcohol-related harms (Interview D-1). 
The Department of Health’s inability to establish a new approach to 
alcohol reflected how influential the industry coalition’s framing of 
ideas had been within government. As one analyst explained, Ireland has 
traditionally had “two parallel and conflicting alcohol policy processes”, 
one concerned with “exploring the extent to which the drinks trade 
could be deregulated” and the other identifying “regulatory systems” for 
reducing consumption and promoting public health (Butler et al., 2017). 
Over the past 15 years, however, the public health coalition has 
steadily gained more influence, helping shift the debate over alcohol. In 
2006, a parliamentary committee suggested that the lack of a permanent 
policy structure for alcohol, unlike drugs, was a key barrier to addressing 
public health concerns (Committee on Arts, Sport, Tourism, Community, 
Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs, 2006). Furthermore, in 2008, during the 
National Drug Strategy steering group’s public consultations, concerns 
about alcohol consumption were “widespread” across local communities 
(Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs, 2009). Several 
interviewees articulated the level of public concern as a key driver of 
change (Interviews A-5, A-6, and A-7). According to one advocate: 
When [government officials] went out to consult communities 
around the drug strategy, [the community] said ‘look, yeah, we do 
have issues around drugs but the bigger problem is alcohol’ (Inter-
view A-2). 
Growing dissatisfaction with the status quo, particularly at the local 
level, presented a key justification for health officials to assert more 
control over alcohol policy. Experts and senior health officials recog-
nised that addressing public concerns and better establishing public 
health influence required a different governance strategy. They also 
recognised that legislation was necessary for such an approach. As one 
public health expert recalled: 
No matter how many strategic task forces you bring together [or] 
how much you put the evidence together … at the end of the day, 
legislation trumps policy … comprehensive [change] … just wasn’t 
going to happen … without legislation (Interview B-1). 
From December 2008, Dr Tony Holohan was the department’s new 
Chief Medical Officer (CMO). Holohan wanted “a more permanent 
institutional structure for alcohol” and reinforced the parliamentary 
committee’s recommendation to incorporate alcohol into the retitled 
National Substance Misuse Strategy (NSMS) (Interview D-1). The 
establishment of an alcohol steering group, with Holohan as co-chair, 
charted a new direction for alcohol policy and strengthened the insti-
tutional position of the public health coalition. 
3.2. Problem stream 
The main motivation for placing alcohol under the NSMS remit 
related to the increased visibility of alcohol-related harms. In the 1990s 
and 2000s, significant increases in alcohol consumption led to increased 
harms (Hope and Butler, 2010), and recorded per capita consumption 
approximately trebled between 1960 and 2001 (Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation, 2011). As one former policy advisor recalled: 
[By 2009] alcohol consumption was over 14 L per capita … it was 
just completely out of control … the government became aware of 
that … [and] the public health community began to say, ‘listen, we 
have to get control of this’ (Interview D-1). 
In the late-2000s, there also was growing recognition across the 
medical profession, particularly among liver specialists, that the long- 
term consumption trends were feeding through to alcohol-related 
harms. As one interviewee from the RCPI recalled: 
Our [doctors] had been going to the international meetings of liver 
specialists and were alarmed by the rate of liver cirrhosis in Ireland 
… they were concerned by the profile of the people who were being 
affected … there were more women [and] younger people … [Liver 
disease] was something that they had traditionally seen in older men 
(Interview A-3). 
The nature of the issue, however, had not been immediately obvious 
to the government. As one public health expert explained: 
There was this lag between the consumption and the harms, but the 
harms came out really strongly … By the time we came to the mid- 
2000s, a lot of the legacy of [increased consumption] was coming 
through … That’s when the healthcare providers and the social care 
providers started saying [to the government], ‘this is under our 
door‘(Interview B-2). 
Despite the chorus of concerns from doctors and other experts, the 
Department of Health did not possess the data to validate or further 
investigate such claims. Few studies in Ireland tracked alcohol con-
sumption or its impact on public health in Ireland (Interviews B-1, B-2 
and A-4). In response, the Health Research Board (HRB) began under-
taking such research, combing through existing data sources, including 
the National Drug-Related Deaths Index, National Drug Treatment 
Reporting System, and consumption data from the Central Statistics 
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Office (Interview B-2). According to one expert, the HRB’s findings “got 
a huge reaction” from the media and civil society.” (Interview B-2). As 
one policy advisor explained, the research provided “new information, 
insight, [and] knowledge” about alcohol’s impact at a “crucial time.” 
(Interview D-1). 
One of the reasons that the HRB’s research was so valuable is because 
it enabled advocates to link alcohol-related harms to broader problems 
with the health system, thereby mainstreaming alcohol as a health 
policy issue. During this time, concerns about the health service in 
Ireland had become “a hot political issue” (Interview A-9). Media 
attention to the “trolley crisis” in Ireland generated a key opportunity for 
those advocating a public health approach to alcohol (Interview A-4). 
Advocates and public health experts responded by drawing explicit links 
between the harms documented in the HRB research and the fiscal 
pressures on the health system (Interview C-4). According to Ged Nash, a 
former Minister of State, and Labour TD (member of parliament): 
The evidence and data … echoe[d] conversations with health pro-
fessionals … The doctors talk[ed] about the absolute catastrophe on 
a Friday, Saturday and Sunday … People coming in with alcohol- 
related injuries … [Health care professionals] felt very strong 
about it … saying ‘look, we really need to change our approach here’ 
(Interview C-1). 
Concerns about alcohol, and specifically “access to cheap drink”, 
were also increasingly being raised during politicians’ clinics with their 
constituents (Interviews C-1 and C-2). As Alex White, also a Labour 
minister, explained, although there was pressure coming from “multiple 
sources”, the public’s desire to “have something done [about alcohol] 
should not be underestimated” (Interview C-2). 
Advocates working at the local level also stressed the importance of 
public pressure. Politicians in Ireland “have a very sensitive ear for 
what’s moving at the grassroots level” and so they would have been 
quite reluctant to “dismiss opinions” coming from their constituents 
(Interviews A-5, A-6 and A-7). Alcohol thus had become an unignorable 
problem for Irish public health and society. 
3.3. The policy stream 
When the government decided to integrate alcohol and drugs into a 
combined NSMS, it established the steering group to help formulate the 
alcohol part. The steering group was highly diverse, comprising officials 
across government departments (e.g., health, justice, transport, tourism 
and sport), major health NGOs, civil society groups, and representatives 
from the alcohol industry. Its task was to specify measures that could 
“tackle the harm caused to individuals and society by alcohol use and 
misuse” (Department of Health, 2012). The group met several times 
between December 2009 and November 2011. Stakeholder submissions, 
as well as reports and policy documents produced at the national and 
international level, informed the group’s discussions (Interviews A-8 
and B-2). The steering group developed and presented its findings and 
recommendations “in the early days of a new government” (Interview 
A-8). 
The group’s final report, released in February 2012, recognised 
alcohol as a major societal problem. It argued that the government had a 
“crucial role by intervening to prevent problems” and identified “price, 
availability and marketing” as the key drivers of alcohol consumption 
(Department of Health, 2012). The report thus adopted a public health 
perspective that sought to address the environmental determinants of 
health bearing upon the key proximal behavioural risk factor of alcohol 
consumption. In its chapter on supply, the report offered several key 
evidence-based population-level measures for decreasing consumption, 
including (but not limited to) measures to influence the availability, 
marketing and price of alcohol (See Box 1). 
Alcohol industry representatives refused to endorse the report and 
released two minority reports in protest (Alcohol Beverage Federation of 
Ireland, 2011; Mature Enjoyment of Alcohol in Society Limited, 2011). 
During the steering group’s deliberations, industry actors continuously 
sought to re-frame the policy problem. As one expert from the steering 
group recalled: 
We argued [with the alcohol industry representatives] about the 
terms of reference and the language around alcohol use and misuse 
… We were still on meeting three discussing this and really that just 
shows how important language is. They really fought against having 
the term alcohol use used [and] always pushing [us] towards misuse 
(Interview B-2). 
This distinction between use and misuse was crucial. If alcohol use 
throughout the population was understood to the source of the social 
and public health problem, then policy measures to reduce overall use 
were needed (Babor et al., 2010). If, however, the misuse of a minority 
of heavy drinkers or “alcoholics” was the problem, there was no need for 
measures that increased price and reduced availability and marketing. 
The key contribution of the international research literature drawn upon 
by the public health coalition was that reduction in overall drinking was 
needed for harms to be reduced across society because they were so 
closely related at a population level (Babor et al., 2010). When discus-
sions moved to particular policy measures, industry actors found some 
support for their concerns. Officials from the Departments of Transport, 
Tourism and Sport (TTS) and Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht held that 
economic impacts of sponsorship restrictions needed to be considered. 
These officials eventually backed the majority’s recommendation but 
the episode revealed the capacity of the industry to form coalitions on an 
issue-by-issue basis. 
The steering group’s comprehensive review of the international and 
national evidence, its broad membership, and its concrete set of policy 
recommendations set it apart from earlier institutional processes. The 
Box 1 
Selected Recommendations from the Steering Group’s 2012 Report  
Policy Lever Description 
Price Introducting a legislative basis for minimum unit pricing 
Availability Requiring structural separation of alcohol from other products in supermarkets and other mixed-retail outlets 
Marketing Numerous restrictions on alcohol marketing and advertising, including: 
• 9:00 p.m. watershed for alcohol advertising on traditional media 
• Restricting alcohol advertising in cinemas to films classified as being suitable for over-18s 
• Subjecting all alcohol advertising in print media to stringent codes, with independent monitoring 
• Prohibiting outdoor alcohol advertising 
• Phasing-out drinks industry sponsorship of sport and other large public events    
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chair, the CMO Holohan, could also use his institutional position to 
ensure that the minister gave proper consideration to the report. As one 
steering group member recalled: 
A lot of [the public health bill] emanate[d] from [the steering group] 
… that’s why the industry [was] quite worried about [the process] 
because when you have a body that’s chaired by the Chief Medical 
Officer and [it] has looked at all the evidence and had all the dis-
cussions and then comes up with those recommendations, that’s a 
good platform to start with (Interview A-8). 
Despite evidence of a clear policy problem and the availability of 
evidence-informed policy responses, the government’s willingness to act 
on these recommendations could not be taken as a given. As another 
public expert explained: 
Evidence is one thing you have in your armament [but] it becomes 
less useful as the debate goes on … [Policy action] comes down to 
timing [and the] order of the things on the agenda. It’s about who’s 
there. It’s about political allegiances. It’s about all that kind of stuff 
(Interview B-1). 
In 2012, at the direction of the CMO, the Department of Health 
commissioned research on public support for the steering group’s key 
policy recommendations. According to one expert, the CMO had asked 
the HRB to “gauge public support” for stricter alcohol measures. The 
thinking was that if the government felt it had public backing it could 
claim “well, the people want it.” The survey research found “majority 
support” for every recommendation “with the exception of the [ban on] 
sports sponsorship” (Interview B-2). 
3.4. The political stream 
Between the appointment of the steering group and the release of its 
recommendations in 2012, the political landscape had shifted pro-
foundly in Ireland. In the 2011 general election, the government, led by 
Fianna Fail, suffered its worst-ever defeat. Fine Gael won the most seats 
in parliament and formed a coalition government with Labour, which 
had won the second-highest number of seats. The shift in political power 
had implications for the development of alcohol policy. Several 
government ministers, particularly those from Labour, wanted to act on 
the recommendations of the steering group. Following the report’s 
release, the junior minister for primary care, Roisin Shortall, began 
“migrating the conclusions of the study” into legislative measures 
(Interview C-2). Tensions between Shortall and the government (over 
the bill and other issues) led to her resignation (Holland, 2012). Short-
all’s successor, Alex White, a Labour TD continued to push for the 
implementation of the steering group’s recommendations (O’Halloran, 
2012). As White recalled: 
I did a lot of discussions and negotiations with other ministers in the 
government cabinet … I was sort of marshalling the thing … and 
discussing the various elements of it with different ministers, with a 
view to bringing forward the heads of the Bill to cabinet (Interview 
C-2). 
In June 2013, the media reported “fretting” within the coalition, 
after the Minister of Health, James Reilly (Fine Gael), and his deputy, 
Alex White, presented their policy proposal to the cabinet (O’Connell, 
2012), largely following the main recommendations of the steering 
group. The proposal included a plan to ban the alcohol industry from 
any sports sponsorship. Although the proposal found some support 
within Labour (Brennan and Kelly, 2013), this part faced immediate 
pushback from Fine Gael members. Moreover, Diageo, comfortably the 
largest producer company, threatened to reduce operations in Ireland if 
the policy progressed (Molloy, 2013). 
During 2013, conflicts between the health ministers and their col-
leagues prominently included Leo Varadkar, the Transport, Tourism and 
Sport (TTS) minister. Key sporting organisations, including the Gaelic 
Athletic Association (GAA), the Irish Rugby Football Union (RFU), and 
the Football Association of Ireland (FAI), lobbied Varadkar (Irish Inde-
pendent. Motion, 2012). 
Alex White identified the strength of the alcohol industry in this 
debate: 
The sports sponsorship was probably the trickiest of all because 
that’s where a lot of the lobbying was done both from the industry 
and from the sports bodies, particularly the rugby and the soccer 
[organisations] (Interview C-2). 
Box 2 
Summary of Findings  




• Department of Health 
• Health Research Board 
• Royal College of 
Physicians Ireland 
Perception that alcohol consumption was entrenched at levels which were internationally 
high, with major health harms associated with them. 
Policy stream Steering Group 
• CMO, Dr Tony Holohan 
• Department of Health 





• Various junior health 
ministers 
• Leo Varadkar 
Advocates 
• Dr Frank Murray 
• Alcohol Health Alliance 
Ireland  
Election results and efforts by the public health advocacy community persuaded signalled a 
shift in the public mood. 
Advocates detected shifts in the public mood and mobilised experts and organisations.    
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Varadkar had maintained that there was insufficient evidence that 
marketing or sponsorship restrictions would reduce under-age drinking, 
the key problem, in his view (Kelly, 2013). A cross-party group echoed 
Varadkar’s concerns, saying that a ban would cause sporting organisa-
tions to “suffer inordinately” (Irish Examiner. Recommend, 2013). The 
nature of the opposition to the proposal, however, was interesting in that 
it varied across different dimensions of this bill. As White explained: 
The remarkable thing [about the process] … was that nobody was 
against the Bill … everybody was for something being done … but 
different people opposed different parts of it and there was always 
somebody against some part of it (Interview C-2). 
According to Ged Nash, there was also “resistance from senior figures 
in Fine Gael” and so there were growing concerns that the “public health 
approach … was going to be compromised” (Interview C-1). Labour 
cabinet ministers told the press about efforts by Fine Gael members to 
lobby them (Irish Independent. Plenty, 2012; de Breadun, 2012). In 
autumn 2013, cabinet dropped the sports sponsorship ban from the 
proposed bill (Danaher and Kelly, 2013). The media identified industry 
lobbying and Leo Varadkar’s opposition as the key influences on that 
decision (Beesley, 2014). 
In October 2013, the government released its alcohol strategy pro-
posals. The legislation would comprise four main pillars: 1) minimum 
unit pricing; 2) the structural separation of alcohol from other products 
in shops; 3) restrictions on alcohol advertising and marketing and 4) 
health information on alcohol product and marketing, including health 
warnings and pregnancy advice. The plan represented the first time the 
government addressed alcohol as a “public health issue” (Irish Exam-
iner, 2013) with sports sponsorship, likely important symbolically, 
omitted (McGee, 2013). 
Despite the backing of the government, the alcohol legislation was 
slow to progress. A major cabinet shuffle in 2014 saw the legislation’s 
two leading champions – Reilly and White – moved out of their port-
folios, with Varadkar installed as the new Minister for Health. 
Notwithstanding activities in his earlier ministerial brief, Varadkar 
took up the “legislation quite enthusiastically” and ended up doing 
“quite a lot of work on it”, White recalled (Interview C-2). In February 
2015, the government published the General Heads of the Public Health 
(Alcohol) Bill and framed the bill as part of its broader Healthy Ireland 
framework (Collins, 2013). The bill outlined a goal of decreasing annual 
alcohol consumption from 11 to 9.1 L per capita by 2020 (Houses of the 
Oireachtas, 2015). 
Varadkar’s attention to alcohol harms and the potential role of 
population-level measures in curbing these harms dramatically shifted 
in his new position. Advocates described the then-health minister’s 
medical background as conducive for policy learning. As one advocate 
explained: 
The fact that [Varadkar’s] a qualified medical doctor … really helped 
us because he understood [the details]. He just had to be briefed, he 
had to read the evidence, [and] read the papers to understand what 
was going on (Interview A-9). 
Those with a long history with Varadkar described how his ideas 
about alcohol shifted over time. One interviewee reflected on a tense 
meeting with Varadkar in 2012 when he questioned the effectiveness of 
MUP and suggested that a ban on below-cost selling – a key alternative 
advocated by the alcohol industry – was an option. As that advocate 
explained: 
If you think about the journey that [Varadkar] took from that [2012] 
meeting … it was just a phenomenal journey for him as a politician 
… accepting the evidence and … policy [from] the public health 
perspective as opposed to the industry perspective … he made a very 
significant, long, personal journey himself on this (Interview A-9). 
Another interviewee articulated a similar experience. 
A few years beforehand … we met with Leo Varadkar … about the 
sport sponsorship … he wasn’t persuaded by our arguments … But it 
was possibly useful … given that he ended up subsequently as min-
ister for health. When I met him again … we were on the same hymn 
sheet … it felt like we were on the same side (Interview A-8). 
Varadkar’s training and attention to the detail of the evidence 
available were important to his “journey” on alcohol. According to one 
former senator, Jillian van Turnhout: 
[Leo Varadkar] had been on a journey … He’s very evidence-focused 
… he can change his mind but only if the evidence is put to him … [I 
remember] at one of the hearings … I [asked if] he [would] consider 
putting cancer warnings [into the legislation], thinking he [would] 
say no. And [I remember] he came back and said, ‘yes, we will 
consider that’ (Interview C-3). 
Others emphasised Varadkar’s relationships with key figures in the 
health department, and specifically the CMO (Interview A-9). Two in-
terviewees suggested that the bill would have been “watered down quite 
substantially” or would have had an entirely different fate if not for 
Varadkar (Interview B-2). In the words of one advocate: 
The timing [of] getting a doctor coming into the Department of 
Health who listened to his chief medical officer [was critical] … we 
were very lucky … we could have had a minister there who just 
would have no interest and didn’t want to know and [the bill] would 
never have happened then (Interview A-9). 
As another advocate explained. 
For me, the game-changer was Varadkar … public health legislation 
is legacy stuff … [and] the Taoiseach is the guy with the power. It 
was his influence that got [the bill] across the line (Interview A-4). 
3.5. The opening of the policy window 
In 2015, the government published the Public Health (Alcohol) Bill. 
Despite the introduction of the bill, there was little chance of it pro-
gressing before a forthcoming general election. The February 2016 
election saw both Fine Gael and Labour lose seats, the latter heavily. The 
results ended the coalition government. Despite its electoral perfor-
mance, Fine Gael retained power with a first ever confidence and supply 
agreement with Fianna Fail, its historic rival. The new government 
announced its programme in May 2016, which included a commitment 
“to enact the Public Health (Alcohol) Bill” (Programme for a Partnership 
Government: the Executive Summary, 2016). None of the major political 
parties opposed the bill. 
The alcohol industry coalition functioned as the main opponent to 
the alcohol bill, using policy reports, press releases and op-eds to 
vocalise its opposition (MacMathuna, 2015; MacMathúna, 2016; DKM 
Economic Consultants, 2017). As other studies have noted, one of ABFI’s 
key strategies was to reframe the debate, identifying alcohol “misuse” as 
the core problem to be addressed (Calnan et al., 2018). 
According to interviews with elected officials (and confirmed with 
lobbying record data), most of the industry’s lobbying efforts were led 
by trade associations, particularly the ABFI (Interviews C-1 and C-3). 
The industry coalition, however, was not entirely united in their oppo-
sition to the bill. As one expert explained: 
The vintners, the publicans, which have a very good lobby group … 
came out in favour of minimum unit pricing in the hope that higher 
prices in the off-trade would lead people back into the on-trade 
(Interview B-1). 
As such, industry actors focused on aspects of the bill where they 
could build the broadest coalition. Structural separation became a key 
target for industry lobbying. Retail trade associations claimed that the 
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new regulations would burden small businesses with new construction 
and labour costs (O’Donovan, 2016). Interviewees described how 
effective the alcohol industry was in mobilising small businesses. As one 
expert explained: 
My observation was that [the alcohol industry] had a very concerted 
campaign for working with the small convenience stores to submit 
their [concerns about the bill to the government] … But the big 
Tesco’s and big international retailers aren’t going to get the same 
sympathy from the public that the small local shop will (Interview B- 
1). 
Another interviewee from the public health coalition described the 
effectiveness of this campaign: 
We were blindsided by the ability of the industry and particularly the 
retailers to just mobilise their army of shopkeepers from around 
Ireland, who seemed to be all sent en masse to go running into their 
local politician … predicting calamity and disaster for their busi-
nesses (Interview A-8). 
In October 2016, the legislative debate over the alcohol bill got un-
derway in the Seanad (Senate, the upper house) (O’Donovan, 2016). 
Responsibility for progressing the legislation in the Seanad was left in 
the hands of a new junior health minister, Marcella Corcoran Kennedy 
(Fine Gael). The junior minister faced “enormous pressure from mem-
bers of her own party” (Interviews A-8 and A-13). Fine Gael senators 
threatened to vote against the bill if the government failed to amend the 
structural separation provision (Ryan, 2016). 
The alcohol industry’s efforts to build a broader coalition of oppo-
nents to the structural separation was successful in slowing the legisla-
tive process down. As Ged Nash recalled: 
Suddenly we had … people … managing small shops and local retail 
chains queuing outside our constituency offices telling us why the 
separation of alcohol … was going to be a huge expense (Interview C- 
1). 
Broader political shifts prevented the alcohol bill from languishing in 
the upper house. In June 2017 Leo Varadkar replaced Enda Kenny as 
Fine Gael leader and Taoiseach (Prime Minister) after what was widely 
perceived as the disappointing general election performance. Varadkar 
appointed Simon Harris (Fine Gael) to serve as health minister and 
instructed him to progress the bill through both houses of parliament as 
soon as possible (O’Regan, 2017). As one advocate explained, “the fact 
that it was [Varadkar’s] bill” before he became Taoiseach “certainly 
helped” (Interview A-9). Given ongoing industry opposition to the entire 
bill, as well as specific provisions within it, Varadkar could have chosen 
to focus on different priorities. As one former policy advisor explained: 
Back in 2014 [Varadkar] could have stalled [the bill], he could have 
put the brakes on it but … he did the opposite … When he [later] 
became the leader of the country … he made it one of his priorities … 
Once he did that, it was game, set and match (Interview D-1). 
Other interviewees stressed the CMO’s skilful handling of the legis-
lative process: 
The Chief Medical Officer was very helpful … he’s a tough wily 
political operator and his support was significant … whenever [the 
Bill] went before the Dáil or the Seanad … he spoke to it and he was 
there to answer the questions, so he very much owned the legislation 
(Interview A-4). 
Although the bill required political leadership for enactment, the 
public health coalition was key in securing broader political support for 
the bill. Between 2016 and 2018, the Alcohol Health Alliance Ireland 
waged a highly sophisticated campaign to advance the legislation (Lesch 
and McCambridge, 2021b). 
The chair of the Alcohol Health Alliance Ireland was Dr Frank 
Murray, a highly respected liver specialist who, at the time, had also 
been serving as the President of the RCPI. Interviewees described Mur-
ray as a calm, highly effective communicator who commanded a lot of 
respect (Interviews A-4, A-10, A-11, A-12, and B-2). His position at the 
RCPI also afforded advocates with key resources (Interview A-12). 
According to one of the strategists behind the campaign: 
We used to do a lot of briefing notes for [politicians], for [their] 
speeches in parliament … we would send them … ten points, ten 
facts that they could use. Things like ‘last week [this number of] ICU 
beds were all taken up by [alcohol-related admissions]’ … They took 
[the information] from us because we had credibility, we had 
authenticity … we were a trusted source of information (Interview A- 
3). 
Minister Harris managed to forge a compromise with key senators, 
exempting smaller shops from the structural separation rules (Irish 
Examiner, 2017). To this end, interviewees credited the influence of 
Murray’s political pragmatism, particularly when concessions had to be 
made to garner political support for the bill. As one politician explained: 
Frank is … a very intelligent, clever operator in the best sense of that 
word. A very open player but very intelligent in the sense that he 
understands the process of compromise, he understands that … if 
you get three out of five things today, that’s better than zero out of 
five (Interview C-2). 
In September 2018, the alcohol industry and its allies waged a final 
lobbying campaign to oppose the bill in the lower house. Following 
meetings with officials and key opposition politicians, however, the 
health minister garnered enough support for the bill (McGee, 2018). In 
October 2018, after nearly 3 years of debate, and more than 6 years since 
the steering group’s report, parliament passed the Public Health 
(Alcohol) Bill (O’Halloran, 2018). Since that time, health officials have 
been implementing different parts of the legislation. Some provisions 
took effect in 2019, including advertising restrictions and 2020, such as 
structural separation, whilst others have yet to commence, including 
MUP and product labelling). 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
Our study has drawn on interview data, policy documents and media 
coverage to deepen understanding of the decision to enact the Public 
Health (Alcohol) Bill in Ireland. Our findings illustrate how a series of 
interconnected developments, unfolding between 2008 and 2018, led to 
this historic policy decision. 
First, we show how developments in the problem stream elevated the 
salience of alcohol-related harm in Ireland. The consequences of 
increased alcohol consumption became increasingly apparent to health 
experts in the late mid to late-2000s. Public concern over alcohol also 
reached new heights, as illustrated by the National Drugs Strategy’s 
public consultations. The degree of public attention was also qualita-
tively different from earlier periods. Previously, there had been wide-
spread recognition that alcohol consumption was on the rise (Hope and 
Butler, 2010). A decade later, however, the health and social impacts 
became much more apparent in public health data and across local 
communities. 
Second, shifts in the institutional location of policymaking authority 
enabled public health advocates to reframe alcohol as a health issue. The 
creation of a steering group chaired by the CMO proved to be highly 
influential for the framing of the broad approach to alcohol policy and 
the specification of measures therein. The steering group had an explicit 
focus on, and mandate to, tackle the harms associated with alcohol. 
Previous attempts to develop recommendations in Ireland had broader 
remits and thus involved a much wider range of stakeholders (Butler, 
2009; Hope and Butler, 2010). The venue shift in 2009 enabled the chair 
and his allies to frame the debate (i.e., alcohol as a public health 
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problem) and generate specific policy recommendations (i.e., 
population-level measures). 
Third, we show how the work of key actors, including politicians and 
public health advocates, helped generate and sustain political mo-
mentum for alcohol public health legislation. Two consecutive elections 
placed key individuals with an interest in alcohol policy into positions of 
influence. Several junior health ministers assumed responsibility for the 
legislation and helped clear several key institutional hurdles. Although 
Leo Varadkar had been an initial critic of the legislation, his appoint-
ment to Health Minister in 2015 and Taoiseach in 2017 proved vital to 
the progression of the bill. His efforts were supported and reinforced by 
the activities of a highly motivated and politically engaged public health 
advocacy coalition, the Alcohol Health Alliance Ireland. Previous ob-
servations have identified a lack of political leadership as a key 
impediment to legislative action (Butler, 2009, 2015). In this more 
recent period, advocates have been much better organised and the 
Department of Health has benefited from a string of strong and highly 
capable ministers keen to develop the application of the public health 
approach to alcohol-related harms in Ireland. 
Our analysis clarifies the value of MSA as well as the ACF in 
explaining how alcohol policy unfolds. It has been observed that a major 
barrier to alcohol policy change in Ireland has been the tendency of 
politicians to “[pay] lip service to the views of public health experts” 
(Butler, 2015). Our analysis suggests that by the period under study, this 
was no longer possible for politicians due to the strengthening of health 
department institutional processes and leadership. Although the alcohol 
industry coalition used several tactics to undermine the bill’s progres-
sion, its efforts were overwhelmed by other forces at play. The data 
sources limit the extent to which we may interrogate the conduct of the 
industry coalition. Our findings suggest that there was a gradual shift in 
Ireland, with the problem, policy and political streams eventually 
converging, and this window of opportunity being recognised by public 
health advocates, senior civil servants and political leaders. A powerful 
set of ideas (i.e., alcohol as a public health problem, population-level 
measures as the appropriate response) took shape in a novel institu-
tional context (i.e., the CMO and Department of Health) and were sub-
sequently championed by key cabinet ministers. Along with Frank 
Murray’s leadership of public health advocates, this constellation of 
forces exerted enormous pressure in forming the wave that washed 
through the political system. 
Proponents of the MSA often stress the role of policy entrepreneurs in 
fostering policy change (Kingdon, 1995; Zahariadis, 2003). Policy en-
trepreneurs can facilitate change by coupling the different streams at 
opportune moments. In this particular case, there was widespread 
agreement that several actors played distinct but complementary lead-
ership roles. Across interviews and other key documents, Leo Varadkar, 
Tony Holohan, and Frank Murray emerged as the central players. Whilst 
all were key, Murray’s behaviour appears most consistent with policy 
entrepreneurship. As noted across interviews, Murray exhibited political 
astuteness, detecting a shift in the national mood in 2015 and mobilising 
advocates at this key moment, just as Holohan had earlier recognised the 
need to gauge public support. Murray also demonstrated effective coa-
lition management skills, keeping his allies on-side when the govern-
ment watered down the bill. 
Emerging research seeks to identify the specific attributes and skills 
that policy entrepreneurs bring to bear on policymaking (Mintrom and 
Norman, 2009; Anderson et al., 2020). The findings presented here 
might shed some light on this. It is noteworthy that Varadkar, Holohan, 
and Murray share a similar background, having all trained as medical 
doctors in the same city, though not all in the same medical school. It is 
possible in the context of a debate about health harms, individuals that 
come from medical backgrounds are perceived to be more credible and 
trustworthy. The size of the policy community in a small country such as 
Ireland may also be relevant here, as the individuals interviewed 
developed and reported on relationships with each other and with in-
dividuals even as they shifted into different roles. 
The findings presented also hold implications for the broader study 
of alcohol policy. Other countries such as England have recently 
contemplated (Hawkins and McCambridge, 2019), or enacted 
population-level approaches to alcohol in Scotland and Wales (Lesch 
and McCambridge, 2020; Katikireddi et al., 2014b; Lesch and McCam-
bridge, 2021c). These developments reveal some cross-national pat-
terns. MUP legislation in Scotland was initially introduced by its Health 
Minister, Nicola Sturgeon. Similar to Varadkar’s ascent, Sturgeon was 
then elected party leader and later elected as head of government. This 
parallel path to leadership via the management of the complex issues 
posed by alcohol legislation is noteworthy. Also similar to Scotland, in 
Ireland alcohol policy was a means by which the articulation of a 
distinctive new vision of health and society was given substance 
(McCambridge et al., 2014; Holden and Hawkins, 2013). 
By contrast, in England, the UK government considered MUP but 
ultimately abandoned it in face of industry pressure. One difference is 
that within the UK government there was no clear policy champion 
prepared to see the policy change through to implementation (Hawkins 
and McCambridge, 2019). The policy context, viewed this way, is 
somewhat similar to Ireland prior to 2008. This suggests that the pursuit 
of population-level approaches to alcohol policy is unlikely to be suc-
cessful in England in the absence of a well-placed policy champion or 
champions. 
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